NOT / Invert Policies

Abstract

The Denim hardfork adds an invert flag to the Policy Registry’s uint64 policy ID. When bit 63 (INVERTED_POLICY_BIT) is set, isAuthorized resolves the base policy and returns the opposite of its result. No new storage is allocated; the flag is query-time only. Every existing policy type — ALLOWLIST, BLOCKLIST, UNION, and INTERSECT — can be inverted. Existing IDs are unaffected because bit 63 was previously unused.

Motivation

The Policy Registry is increasingly used as a shared registry of addresses that other policies compose around. Without invert, expressing “NOT policy A” requires a second policy of the opposite type containing a copy of A’s membership. Any membership change must then land on both policies; a lagging update admits invalid accounts or rejects valid ones. A composite that needs “A AND NOT X” cannot reuse X — it must point at a separately-maintained mirror. Encoding inversion in the policy reference solves this. The same registry entry supports expressions such as A OR B, A AND NOT B, or NOT A without additional policies. One address list, managed once, represents either side of a rule depending on how it is referenced.

What Changed

New constant and helper

PolicyRegistryConstants

uint64 internal constant INVERTED_POLICY_BIT = uint64(1) << 63;

IPolicyRegistry

function invertedPolicyId(uint64 policyId) external view returns (uint64);

invertedPolicyId returns policyId ^ INVERTED_POLICY_BIT. It is pure (reads no state), never reverts, and is involutive: invertedPolicyId(invertedPolicyId(id)) == id.

Updated selector table

Symbol	Selector	Status	Notes
`invertedPolicyId(uint64)`	`0x6b468933`	NEW	Pure XOR of bit 63; never reverts, reads no state
`isAuthorized(uint64,address)`	unchanged	Extended	Inverted ID resolves the base and returns the negated result; fail-closed on unknown/malformed base
`policyExists(uint64)`	unchanged	Extended	Strips to base: `policyExists(invertedPolicyId(id)) == policyExists(id)`
`policyAdmin(uint64)`	unchanged	Extended	Strips to base
`pendingPolicyAdmin(uint64)`	unchanged	Extended	Strips to base
`compositePolicyChildIds(uint64)`	unchanged	Extended	Strips the queried composite’s own flag; child IDs returned verbatim, including any per-child invert bit
`createCompositePolicy(address,uint8,uint64[])`	unchanged	Extended	A child ID may carry the invert bit (“A AND NOT X”); validated against its base
`updateComposite(uint64,uint64[])`	unchanged	Extended	Same per-child invert handling

Authorization behavior

isAuthorized gains a leading invert branch. All non-inverted paths are byte-identical to the previous behavior.

isAuthorized pseudocode

isAuthorized(policyId, account):
    if policyId has INVERTED_POLICY_BIT set:
        base = policyId & ~INVERTED_POLICY_BIT
        if not policyExists(base):      // fail-closed guard
            return false
        return not isAuthorized(base, account)

    ... existing ALLOWLIST / BLOCKLIST / UNION / INTERSECT dispatch ...

An inverted ID over an unknown or malformed base returns false — it never becomes allow-everyone. This guards against a typo’d or garbage ID with bit 63 set from bypassing mint, transfer, or seize checks.

Getter strip semantics

Read views strip bit 63 via _basePolicyId(id) = id & ~INVERTED_POLICY_BIT and load the base record. An inverted ID has no independent storage record; it mirrors the base’s existence, admin, pending admin, and child set.

Composite child invert

A child ID in createCompositePolicy or updateComposite may carry the invert bit. The registry validates the child against its base: an inverted simple child (ALLOWLIST or BLOCKLIST) is accepted; an inverted composite child is rejected with InvalidChildPolicy to preserve the flat-tree invariant. Across the whole child set, PolicyNotFound takes precedence over InvalidChildPolicy.

Storage and gas

No new storage slots. Invert is query-time only — one boolean flip in memory. There is no extra SLOAD.

Examples

Invert a sanctions blocklist so the policy reads “not sanctioned”:

Standalone invert

uint64 notSanctions = policyRegistry.invertedPolicyId(sanctionsId);
// notSanctions == sanctionsId ^ (uint64(1) << 63)

“Allowed to transfer = on KYC list AND not sanctioned” via an INTERSECT composite:

Composite with inverted child

uint64 notSanctions = policyRegistry.invertedPolicyId(sanctionsId);
policyRegistry.createCompositePolicy(admin, INTERSECT, [kycId, notSanctions]);

Fail-closed guarantee: for any never-created base ID, isAuthorized(base | INVERTED_POLICY_BIT, account) returns false.

Migration

This change is not breaking. All existing selectors, events, and errors are unchanged. Existing IDs have bit 63 unset, so all existing behavior is identical.

Compute the inverted ID

Call invertedPolicyId(policyId) on the registry, or set bit 63 directly with policyId | (uint64(1) << 63).

Bind it to a B20 scope

Pass the inverted ID to updatePolicy for a standalone scope, or include it as a child in createCompositePolicy / updateComposite. B20 treats the ID as an opaque uint64 and requires no changes.

Validate at write time

Consumers that store policy IDs must still call policyExists(policyId) at write time. This works for inverted IDs because existence resolves to the base.

Alternatives Considered

Alternative 1 — New `NOT` policy type

createNot(admin, base) allocates a fresh record pointing at a base. A first-class NOT node wraps any policy and offers the clearest explorer legibility. Rejected: standalone NOT costs about 3 SLOADs versus 1 for a mirror blocklist; “A AND NOT X” costs about 6 versus the chosen approach’s 4. It also adds a new create path and deepens hot-path recursion as a composite child.

Alternative 2 — Per-child invert bitmask on the composite

A bitmask packed into the children length word flips individual children. mask = 0 reproduces today’s behavior with no migration. Rejected: the flag only works inside a composite — a simple policy cannot be inverted without wrapping it in a composite with a minimum of two children. There is no standalone referenceable inverse of an arbitrary policy.

Test Cases

The new suite (test/unit/PolicyRegistry/isAuthorizedInvert.t.sol, 16 cases) covers:

Fail-closed invariants: inverted unknown base returns false
Simple/built-in truth tables for ALLOWLIST and BLOCKLIST
INTERSECT[A, ~X] composite evaluation
Child validation: inverted simple child accepted, inverted composite child rejected
Getter strip semantics: policyExists, policyAdmin, pendingPolicyAdmin, compositePolicyChildIds
invertedPolicyId round-trip involution

Overview

Denim

Cobalt

Beryl

Azul

Optimism

Abstract

Motivation

What Changed

New constant and helper

Updated selector table

Authorization behavior

Getter strip semantics

Composite child invert

Storage and gas

Examples

Migration

Alternatives Considered

Alternative 1 — New `NOT` policy type

Alternative 2 — Per-child invert bitmask on the composite

Test Cases

​Abstract

​Motivation

​What Changed

​New constant and helper

​Updated selector table

​Authorization behavior

​Getter strip semantics

​Composite child invert

​Storage and gas

​Examples

​Migration

​Alternatives Considered

​Alternative 1 — New NOT policy type

​Alternative 2 — Per-child invert bitmask on the composite

​Test Cases

Abstract

Motivation

What Changed

New constant and helper

Updated selector table

Authorization behavior

Getter strip semantics

Composite child invert

Storage and gas

Examples

Migration

Alternatives Considered

Alternative 1 — New `NOT` policy type

Alternative 2 — Per-child invert bitmask on the composite

Test Cases